





 Colin Koopman 2011 
ISSN: 1832-5203 




Foucault and Pragmatism: Introductory Notes on Metaphilosophical Methodology 
Colin Koopman, University of Oregon 
 
ABSTRACT: Being an introduction to a special issue on the theme of ‚Foucault and Prag-
matism‛ this article offers a brief set of metaphilosophical comments on the project of building 
bridges across familiar philosophical divides.  The paper addresses questions in metaphiloso-
phical methodology raised by the pairing in the issue title:  What is at stake in the comparison 
of philosophical figures like Michel Foucault and John Dewey?  What is at stake in the compa-
rison of philosophical traditions such as Genealogy and Pragmatism?  How can we most ef-
fectively develop comparative work across the entrenched divides, which such comparative 
work often labors to overcome? 
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Philosophical Bridgework 
The papers collected in this special issue of Foucault Studies all fit well under the heading of 
‚Foucault and Pragmatism‛—but that heading itself expresses a basic disanalogy that any 
effort in comparative philosophy must confront.  The disanalogy is rather obvious as soon as it 
is pointed out.  Foucault is a figure, a philosopher, and a thinker.  Pragmatism is an intellectu-
al tradition, a philosophical milieu, and a style of thinking.  What is the use of comparing the 
work of thought across two registers that function differently, demand different modalities of 
scrutiny, and which ought to be subjected to different kinds of criticism?  A number of good 
answers to this question are implicit (and indeed quite often explicit) in the eight essays (and 
one review essay) that follow.  In this introduction I shall briefly clarify the comparative terms 
of the articles that follow by describing two possible interpretations of the basic project of this 
issue, which is to say, two different interpretations of how one might set about the task of 
bringing Foucault and Pragmatism into conversation with one another.  There are, of course, 
many other ways besides these two of launching, and then sustaining, comparative conversa-
tion in philosophy.  With respect to the terms here under comparison, however, these are the 
most obvious and probably also the most demanding and provocative routes currently avail-
able. 
Before describing these two basic methodological options, I would like to begin with a 
brief set of comments concerning the value, motivation, and justification of the comparative 
task itself.  This special issue was constructed, and most fortunately executed, as an attempt at 
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building a bridge over a self-imposed gap.  Allow me to construct an image of this.  Picture, if 
you will, the following. 
Camps of philosophers cordon themselves off from one another by drawing lines in the 
still sands of a breezeless desert.  There they entrench, intently looking each other down from 
opposite sides of the line for some rather long period of time.  Still sands separate steady 
stares.  But eventually they tire of looking across the divide, and so begin to fraternize with 
only those philosophers in their proximity.  Later they forget about the philosophers on the 
other side of the line, and when the occasional hawkeyed upstart or pesky defector announces 
the existence of a seeming country of philosophers not too far away, they retort that those on 
the other side of the line are not ‘real’ philosophers.  They are, the upstart and the defector are 
told, philosophical poseurs at best, or philosophical perverts at worst.  The language that is 
used, in fact, is exactly that contemptuous and contentious.  After a generation or two, nobody 
remembers why the line was drawn, or what function it serves.  But it is defended as vigo-
rously as ever.  Sometime soon thereafter, newly-indoctrinated apprentices begin asking 
questions that those keeping the line can barely comprehend, let alone answer.  ‚Why don’t 
we read Deleuze here?  Have you read him?  He’s really interesting to me.  And what about 
Foucault?‛  ‚Why do you insist that Quine is dry and unimportant?  Have you read him?  
He’s really quite interesting to me.  And what about Dewey?‛  Soon the line-keepers abandon 
their fortifications, but of course nearly everyone continues to talk only to those philosophers 
in their immediate proximity.  The apprentices, meanwhile, begin building bridges over the li-
nes in the sand.  Even though they are but thin lines in a breezeless desert, nobody knows how 
to cross over them in the familiar manners of walking, and the only way the apprentices can 
manage to muster a conversation is to carefully artifice means of passage from one camp to the 
other.  These bridges, sometimes quite garish constructions, mediate.  They function as ave-
nues of conversation, transaction, and mutually-informative intervention.  Eventually, it is 
hoped, the bridges will begin to seem unnecessary, and philosophers will effortlessly walk 
across those tiny little lines, eventually rubbing them out with their footprints, as they stare up 
in wonder at the spectacular sculptures above that stand as a memorial to a not-too-distant 
time when all philosophers were afraid to walk paths that are now frequently trod by just 
about everyone. 
This little story describes, in the very rough sense that is the best that can be achieved 
by such a depiction, the past, current, and possible future state of professional academic phi-
losophy.  The moral of the story can be put in a somewhat pedantic and brash idiom if need be 
(as sometimes is the case): the entrenched impasse between ‘Analytic’ and ‘Continental’ 
philosophy is now more worthless than ever.  The same can, and should, be said of other stan-
ding impasses perhaps less firmly entrenched but yet just as divisive.  There is now more rea-
son than ever to abandon the divides that separate ‘Pragmatist’ or ‘American’ philosophy 
from those other two constituencies just mentioned.  All of these divisions are obstacles to pro-
ductive philosophical work on the critical problems we face in the present, as a culture and so-
ciety, as a discipline and profession, and as ethical matters we all feel the force of in intensely 
personal ways. 
This special issue is a twofold effort according to this little story.  First, it is an effort to 
continue building those bridges across traditional divides, according to the blueprints and 
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plans that have now been in place for at least a decade or two.  Second, it is an effort at lear-
ning to walk across lines in a breezeless dessert without the aid of elaborate bridges, in such a 
way as to invite philosophical work that directly, forthrightly, and unapologetically draws on 
themes, topics, figures, and concepts that span artificial divisions that other philosophers 
continue to unproductively impose upon themselves.  This little story and these two goals are 
not meant as a revolutionary call, a manifesto, or a program.  All this is offered, much more 
humbly, as a description that lends some concreteness to certain efforts in philosophy that are 
already underway.  That this work is already underway is rendered most visibly in those areas 
of philosophy focused on problems more than on traditions and figures: critical race theory, 
feminist philosophy, environmental philosophy, and many subfields in moral, social, legal, 
and political philosophy.  It is also underway, and increasingly so, in the context of work in 
‘core’ subfields which often take as their (perhaps unconscious) focus the body of work con-
stituted by a tradition or a figure, or (increasingly so) traditions or figures in the plural.  Fur-
ther, it is underway in the context of other forms of bridgework, including most importantly 
cross-disciplinary engagements amongst philosophers, anthropologists, historians, sociolo-
gists, and other interlocutors conversing across familiar disciplinary divides.1 
It is time to gain more self-consciousness about all this work we are doing.  It is my 
hope that this collection of papers can contribute to this increasing self-consciousness. 
All articles included here were written by authors who were chosen with an eye to-
ward the excellence of their philosophical scholarship, the range of their philosophical curio-
sity, and above all the plurality of their own philosophical orientations.  Both individually and 
collectively they have achieved far more than I could have hoped for.  I am, as I should have 
expected to be, truly impressed to witness this work of their thought.  Allow me, then, to ten-
der an expression of gratitude to them for this work: thank you for the opportunity. 
I shall not here attempt a gloss or summary of the papers that follow, as is a standard 
practice in introductions of this sort.  In this case at least, the authors have provided their own 
abstracts, which the reader may consult.  I have conceived of my editorial role as that of col-
lection, and in many instances also that of recommendation, but not of interpretation.  That is 
now your job, should you wish to assume it.  Where the papers stand in need of interpretation, 
I have either asked the authors in advance of publication to clear up the difficulties in ques-
tion, or I have judged these matters of interpretation appropriate to the act of reception. 
Having offered something of a metaphilosophical justification for this collection, I re-
turn now to the issues of metaphilosophical methodology mentioned at the outset.  I shall ad-
dress these by describing two different approaches for building bridges between Foucault and 
Pragmatism.  One approach involves taking up the task of comparative philosophy at the level 
of philosophical traditions.  Another involves working comparatively at the level of individual 
thinkers.  These two approaches are not incompatible but they are distinguishable and so I 
shall here treat them as analytically separate for the purposes of exposition. 
 
                                                 
1 On cross-disciplinary uses of Foucault, as well as Foucault’s status across the disciplines, see my intro-
duction to another special issue on Foucault I am presently curating, tentatively entitled ‚Foucault Across 
the Disciplines‛ and forthcoming in the 2011 volume of History of the Human Sciences. 
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Two Traditions: Genealogy & Pragmatism 
In two books, one recent and one forthcoming, I have advanced an argument on behalf of a 
philosophical combination of genealogy and pragmatism.2  The gist of my argument, forcing 
myself to boil the details of hundreds of pages down to a concise but not pithy formulation, 
can be put as follows: 
Pragmatism is best seen as a forward-facing practice of philosophical critique that looks 
toward the responsive reconstruction of problematic situations in which we sometimes find 
ourselves—pragmatism teaches us to bring solutions whenever we bring problems, to focus 
on the meliorative attunement to difficulties at hand, and to furnish for ourselves possibilities 
of improvement on the basis of resources made available to us by the wider environments, in 
which we sometimes find ourselves blocked and bottlenecked. 
Genealogy should be seen as a historical backward-facing practice of philosophical cri-
tique that looks to articulate, so as to intensify, the problematizations which condition our pos-
sibilities for doing, thinking, and being in the present. Genealogy teaches us to take our pro-
blems very seriously indeed so as to focus on the severity of the situations in which we often 
find ourselves rather than dissimulating ourselves with the promise of glib solutions. 
According to these interpretations, it might seem as if pragmatism and genealogy 
would face us in opposite directions, and so have little ambition to truck with one another.  
However, such a conclusion could only be drawn too quickly.  In fact, pragmatism and genea-
logy stand in need of one another.  Any full-scale practice of critical inquiry requires the fulfill-
ment of both intellectual desiderata of reconstruction and problematization—hence critical 
inquiry itself calls for something like pragmatism that provides a reconstructive service as well 
as something like genealogy that performs a diagnostic service.  To perform only one of these 
services is to chagrin the responsibilities we have assumed in embracing the task of thought as 
work.  We must kick up the dust, and then work to settle it again.  We must meliorate in the 
midst of a problem, and then look hard to see what new problems we may have inadvertently 
facilitated. 
It is not only the case that pragmatism and genealogy stand in need of one another as 
traditions of critical inquiry.  Going even further, we can say that they also positively invite 
one another.  This is so insofar as both traditions train the work of thought to focus on pro-
blems-and-resolutions.  To put this differently, the basic categories with which both the prag-
matist and the genealogist work are problems and responses, rather than, say, truth and 
falsity, or thesis and antithesis.  Both philosophical traditions are present-centered in the mode 
of what R.G. Collingwood often referred to as the logic of question-and-answer.  The genea-
                                                 
2  See Colin Koopman, Pragmatism as Transition: Historicity and Hope in James, Dewey, and Rorty (New York: 
Columbia University Press, 2009) and Colin Koopman, Genealogy as Critique: Problematization and Transformation in 
Foucault & Others (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, forthcoming).  See also my (earlier) draft review of the 
existing literature (through 2007) on these subjects in Colin Koopman, ‚Pragmatism and Genealogy: An Over-
view of the Literature‛, unpublished at SSRN at <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1011513>.  
My project, with respect to the metaphilosophical issues discussed here, further develops work along pathways 
initially laid down by only a handful of others, but especially Paul Rabinow, Anthropos Today: Reflections on 
Modern Equipment (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003) and John Stuhr, Pragmatism, Postmodernism, and 
the Future of Philosophy (New York: Routledge, 2003). 
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logist begins in the present, with a problem inchoately sensed or felt, and works historically to 
expose and articulate the conditions that make the problem possible.  The pragmatist also be-
gins in the present, with a problem roughly sensed or perhaps already described in fine, and 
works with the future in mind to articulate and innovate practices that promise a resolution of 
the problematic situation.3 
In sum, a combination of pragmatism and genealogy is exactly what is needed to 
accomplish what we ought to expect of ourselves as critical inquiries.  Critical inquiry requires 
a genealogical pragmatism that knows how to diagnose as well as to anticipate, to proble-
matize as well as to reconstruct. 
 
Two Figures: Foucault & Dewey, or Foucault & James, or Foucault & Rorty, & c.. 
Having advanced in very capsule form my arguments about the traditions of genealogy and 
pragmatism as diagnostic and reconstructive respectively, allow me to turn briefly to some of 
the paradigmatic figures in virtue of which these traditions of thought are constructed.  For 
here we can come to terms with a quite different comparative model in virtue of which we 
might relate the two terms that are the conceptual focus of this issue: Foucault and Prag-
matism.  A quick scan of the table of contents reveals that most (indeed on some reading, all) 
of the papers comprising this issue advance the comparative effort here described in terms of 
comparisons between philosophical figures.  We have papers on Foucault and Dewey (Rabi-
now, Colapietro, May, Gayman), Foucault and James (Edmonds, May, Marchetti), Foucault 
and Follett (Pratt), Foucault and West (Stone), and Foucault and Rorty (Malecki, May).  The 
papers themselves can better speak than I to this second of the two comparative approaches 
distinguished here, but a few final comments are in order so as to further elucidate some of 
my own claims in the previous section. 
One criticism I frequently hear of the argument sketched above about the traditions of 
Pragmatism and Genealogy is that both traditions, in fact, show signs of a commitment to both 
reconstruction and problematization.  It is sometimes urged, in other words, that insofar as the 
critic must fulfill their charge by assuming both tasks of diagnostic problem-raising and 
melioristic problem-solving, then the philosopher can do this wholly within the confines of the 
traditions of pragmatism, or genealogy.  Those who identify as pragmatists frequently urge 
upon me their view that Dewey is not only a reconstructor, but also a problematizer.  Those 
who identify as genealogists frequently suggest that Foucault is not only a problematizer, but 
also a reconstructor.  This is probably true in both instances.  Nevertheless, it would betray a 
provincialism of taste for pragmatists to reject genealogy on these terms alone, or for genea-
logists to ignore pragmatism for no other reason than the sense that they do not stand in need 
of resources, which they can already glean from their own tradition. 
Further, there remains the question of distinguishing Dewey as thinker from Dewey as 
pragmatist, and Foucault as thinker from Foucault as genealogist.  No doubt every thinker ex-
ceeds at times (perhaps oftentimes) those traditions for which they become paradigms.  Locke 
is not in every instance an empiricist nor is Descartes in all respects a rationalist.  We construct 
                                                 
3 I thank Nick Dorzweiler for stimulating thoughts on the matters addressed in this paragraph. 
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canons and traditions by selectively emphasizing certain elements of the great dead philo-
sophers in virtue of which such construction is made possible. 
Dewey was not always a pragmatist about everything.  Indeed he often preferred other 
labels, other –isms such as instrumentalism, to name his work.  Peirce firmly rejected the prag-
matism label after James hijacked it.  Indeed, James is the only pragmatist who seems to have 
been entirely comfortable with the label, with the requisite caveat that he could accept it only 
if he were allowed to combine it pluralistically with other –isms, including pluralism and 
radical empiricism.  Perhaps Rorty too can be read as a pragmatist, but no pragmatist’s claim 
to the label was ever more contested than Rorty’s. He has been the subject of vociferous and 
continuous criticism of his credentials with respect to pragmatism. 
Foucault was simply not always a genealogist about everything.  Foucault always de-
scribed himself as writing genealogies rather than as endorsing some philosophical position 
that might someday assume the form of an –ism.  It is well known, and now widely acknow-
ledged after many years of misleading though perhaps requisite dispute, that Foucault was 
also committed in the final years of his work to the task of transforming and reconstructing the 
terms of modern subjectivity.  It is probably also the case that Foucault was always committed 
to this positive task of self-transformation.  There is, to put it simply, a great deal in Foucault 
that cannot be squarely or easily comprehended under the rubric of genealogical diagnosis. 
The lesson here is obvious, once you think about it: figures are not equivalent to the 
traditions for which they later become paradigms.  It is, then, no surprise that Foucault, De-
wey, James, Rorty and Nietzsche were all reconstructors and problematizers, diagnosticians 
and meliorists, agents of productive change as well as of unrelenting critique.  This, however, 
does not determine our answer to two important and related questions.  First, at what did they 
excel?  Second, in virtue of what do they belong to the familiar philosophical traditions with 
which we so often categorize the great philosophers of the past? 
Did Dewey excel at diagnosis as much as he did at reconstruction?  Only the most en-
trenched pragmatist would take Dewey’s rather amateurish intellectual histories as seriously 
as we ought to take the work of more contemporary intellectual and cultural historians 
(Foucault included), whose lives are (or were) lived in the archives.  Dewey, of course, at-
tempted something of genealogical diagnosis in many of his works.  One finds a brief intellec-
tual history of philosophy itself in the pages of Reconstruction in Philosophy and The Quest for 
Certainty.  The middle chapters of The Public and Its Problems similarly take the form of a brief 
(all-too-brief) history of the present with respect to the conditions of political communication 
and interaction.  Dewey was clearly committed to the work of thought known as historical di-
agnosis and exemplified by genealogists from Nietzsche to Foucault and beyond.  But Dewey 
was not as successful at this form of inquiry as he was at other modalities of philosophy.  Nor 
did he explicitly thematize it with anywhere near the degree of clarity that he thematized 
thought in its reconstructive mode.  Dewey knew that historical problematization was im-
portant.  But he knew how to show how and why reconstruction was important.  The diffe-
rence here is critical.  For it is in virtue of this difference that we can clearly locate his primary 
achievement as a philosopher.  It is with respect to pragmatist reconstruction that Dewey 
made a name, is remembered as a great philosopher, and is still read today.  This is why 
everyone knows that Dewey is a pragmatist and only the most committed Dewey scholars 
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would even suggest that Dewey can be read as a genealogist.  Perhaps he can be read that 
way.  But what is the use of such a reading other than worshipping the feet of the master at 
which one sits?  If one wants to do genealogy (or some other form of history compatible with a 
pragmatist historiography), one should perfectly well admit that this is consistent with every-
thing that Dewey said about pragmatism, and was in fact thoroughly encouraged by Dewey 
himself.  This being said, one need not insist that one can learn from Dewey everything that 
one ought to know about genealogy.  Much of the same also holds for James and Rorty, 
though in their case I believe that one finds a more nuanced conception of diagnosis, self-
critique, and irony than one does in any of the other pragmatists.  Still, that which makes them 
pragmatists, that in virtue of which they continue to light fires for us today, has more to do 
with forward-facing reconstruction than it does to do with historical-facing genealogies.  To 
achieve the latter, those of us immersed in the works of Dewey would do well to turn to 
Foucault for lessons about how to construct a historical problematization of the present. 
Did Foucault accomplish as much in the context of ethical reconstruction as he is in-
famous for in the context of problematizing current political and epistemic formations?  Before 
I offer my answer, I beg the reader to note the formulation of the question.  The question does 
not pose the possibility of an indictment of Foucault’s ethics so much as it asks us to compara-
tively assess the relative gravity of Foucault’s achievements.  Noting the formulation, then, the 
answer to this question, for almost every reader of Foucault outside of self-described Foucaul-
tians, is clearly negative.  Foucault is known to us as a great problematizer, a great skeptic, a 
famously suspicious thinker who helps us to be critical of ourselves.  Nobody need deny that 
Foucault, at least in his later work, turned his attention to the possibilities of an ethical res-
ponse to the enduring problematizations of modern powers and freedoms we find ourselves 
enmeshed in today.  Nobody need deny that Foucault’s conception of an ethics of self-trans-
formative freedom promises much, especially in the midst of those modern morality systems 
which would ask us to reduce ethics to the formulation and following of rules, codes, and 
principles.  Yet when it comes to specifying the specific forms that the general architecture of 
self-transformative freedom might take today, Foucault has offered us little more than those 
promises.  Whether in his writings about pleasure or parrhesia, most of his readers have found 
Foucault’s ethics wanting when put up against his impressive diagnostic problematization of 
modern moral selfhood.  The most compelling line of defense for Foucault’s ethics from fa-
miliar charges is that they leave open the possibility of an ethical self-fashioning in the present 
rather than prescribing to us some particular code of action.  Surely this is true, so far as it 
goes.  And yet this insight is not Foucault’s alone.  Others have gone as far as Foucault, if not 
further, in describing how specific practices of self-transformative freedom might offer pro-
mising paths for responding to some of the more intractable problematizations that condition 
us today.  Foucault’s importance was in his mode of diagnostic thinking, not in his accom-
plishments in directly helping us to reconstruct the conditions in which we find ourselves 
today.  For the latter, Foucault needs something like American pragmatism or Frankfurt cri-
tical theory or Anglo-American analytic ethics in order that we might put him to work in pro-
ductive ways that are anticipated, but not yet actualized, in his work. 
 




For all that I have urged here, this is but an outline of an argument that must proceed in a 
fuller way elsewhere.  Having only skated over the surface of that argument here, a simple but 
important reminder remains to be made.  The biography of Foucault is not the history of ge-
nealogy, nor is an episode in the history of pragmatism the entire biography of Dewey.  In 
comparing Foucault and Dewey (or Foucault and any other figure in the pragmatist tradition), 
it behooves us to compliment the entire range of thought exhibited by the thinkers in question.  
The papers that follow, since the terms of their comparison are more at the level of figures 
than of traditions, perform this task excellently. 
The papers collected here thus act, in at least one respect, as an excellent counterweight 
to some of my own prior efforts in a comparative analysis of pragmatism and genealogy. This 
is even the case where my comparative efforts have proceeded, using various figures (Fou-
cault, Williams, Dewey, Rorty) as mouthpieces for the traditions that are the primary object of 
scrutiny.  I hasten to issue the reminder that counterweights do not cancel one another out, so 
much as they balance a broader edifice that might otherwise topple.  The bridges we are in the 
midst of building will surely be elaborate just insofar as the obstacles they must weave around 
are many.  Counterweights, placed in the most unexpected and awkward parts of the overall 
architecture, will accordingly be necessary.  Anyone partaking in such endeavors should be in 
possession of humility sufficient for fostering the pluralism that is not only the goal of such 
bridge-building but also the methodological means by which anything of this type may come 
to be constructed. 
The essays collected here demonstrate that the kinds of work I have been discussing 
make for an immensely challenging labor.  For that reason, but not only that, it is an im-
mensely rewarding labor, both when we succeed on our own terms in reconstructive fashion 
and also when we find ourselves confronting those problems which afford real possibilities for 
learning.  If there is any message that is common to genealogy and pragmatism it is exactly 
this: there is enormous value in educating ourselves about our selves.  May we always con-
tinue to learn after this fashion.4 
 
Colin Koopman 
Department of Philosophy 
University of Oregon 
1295 U of O; 1415 Kincaid St., PLC 338 




                                                 
4 For their comments on earlier versions of this introduction I would like to thank Elena Clare Cuffari, Nick 
Dorzweiler, Dirk Felleman, Sarin Marchetti, and Nathan Pai Schmitt. 
